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OPTING OUT OF PUBLIC PROVISION
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CASE FOR OPTING OUT
There exist multiple sources to which we look for satisfaction of our
material wants or needs, that is for the allocation of resources. Rough classifi-
cation divides these sources into self-production, or the household; transactions
with strangers, or the market; provision (either contractual or donative) by
those outside a kinship group, but within a narrow community (such as a
church group or social club); and provision by government either with (as in
the case of services provided for user fees) or without (as in the case of goods
provided by general taxation) direct compensation.' Much legal regulation
deals with the proper mix of these sources of provision by creating incentives,
prohibitions, and mandates for one or more of these groups to provide a par-
ticular good or service. Legal rules that mandate2 or preclude3 government in-
volvement in production or that constrain market transactions or that allow
transactions in families4 that might be prohibited among strangers are essen-
tially mechanisms for allocating the resource allocation function itself among
these different institutions.
Recent years have seen substantial argument in favor of shifting to the
market provision and production functions previously undertaken by govern-
ment. The increased intensity of arguments for privatization in all its forms' is
* Perre Bowen Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A., Amherst
College, 1972; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1985. Thanks to Saul Levmore, Bill
Stuntz, Fred Schauer, participants at the Symposium on the New Private Law at the University of
Denver Law School and at workshops at the University of Virginia School of Law, George Mason
University School of Law, and the Canadian Law and Economics Association.
1. See, e.g., PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING AND DESTITLTON 26
(1993).
2. See, for instance, the various state constitutional clauses that require the provision of a
system of public education. For a summary, see Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Di-
rections in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995).
3. For instance, the "public purpose" requirement prohibits governmental entities from
participating in enterprises that provide benefits to an insufficient proportion of the general public.
See, e.g., State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 278 S.E.2d 612, 616-17 (S.C. 1981).
4. Children may work in family businesses under circumstances that would not be permit-
ted if they were working outside the family. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212 (1994).
5. Privatization is a phrase that has been loosely applied to a myriad of arrangements that
shift government responsibilities to the marketplace. Only in its extreme form, however, does the
market entirely displace government. In more moderate forms, government retains some role in
the provision of the "privatized" good or service. For instance, government may specify the char-
acteristics of the good or service to be provided, such as where government contracts out for the
manufacture of goods that the government itself distributes; or, government may regulate and
retain the right to dismiss the private actor, such as where cities contract with private firms for
collection of garbage. For an examination of the range of privatization, see Ronald A. Cass, Pri-
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neither novel nor surprising. The economist Albert 0. Hirschman has docu-
mented the shifting preferences that people share for dependence on the public
and the private realms, as reliance on either generates disappointment and a
desire for change.6 In legal literature, the absence of a clear public/private
distinction has been the source of substantial commentary suggesting both that
government might engage in heretofore "private" activities and that markets
might invade the previously "public" realm.7 That any such transformation
would follow a long tradition of employing private entities to accomplish pub-
lic goals is evidenced by Hendrik Hartog's rich description of privately sup-
ported municipal developments in New York,8 and the Handlins' history of
the interplay of public/private cooperation to construct the infrastructure of
post-Revolutionary Massachusetts.9
In its most current incarnation, much of the debate about privatization
centers on the replacement of public provision of goods and services with
private markets." This part of the debate implicitly assumes that public and
private provision of services traditionally supplied by government are plausible
alternatives. That is to say that the good or service at issue has sufficient char-
acteristics of a public good that it may be appropriate for government to be
involved in its provision; but that the good also exhibits sufficient characteris-
tics of a private good that demand for it will not be significantly understated
and adequate numbers of providers will arise if government provision is re-
placed by market forces." Under these conditions, the relevant question be-
comes, which plausible source of a good or service will provide it in a manner
most consistent with a selected standard, e.g., which source will provide the
good most efficiently or most fairly?
Implicit in much of this debate is the assumption that private provision
displaces the need for government involvement in the same area, so that the
vatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449 (1987).
6. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC
ACTION (1982).
7. See generally Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982).
8. See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER (1983).
9. OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY F. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (rev. ed. 1969).
10. See, e.g., JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989); Cass, supra note 5.
11. A public good is defined by two characteristics: it can be jointly consumed by more than
one person simultaneously (nonrivalness); and, once produced, no one can be excluded from en-
joying its benefits, even those who did not contribute to its production (nonexclusivity). Classic
examples include sunshine, knowledge, and national defense. Local public goods have these char-
acteristics within more limited geographic boundaries, e.g., mosquito spraying or paved streets.
Traditional public finance theory suggests that market forces will undersupply public goods be-
cause no one has an incentive to incur the costs related to their production, since no one has an
incentive to purchase them from the producer (because once produced and paid for by some other
party, the nonpayor can still enjoy the good's benefits). For that reason, government provision
(and collection of taxes to pay for the good) is traditionally seen as a solution to the problem of
public goods.
There is substantial literature on the substitutability of markets for government in the pro-
duction of goods with public goods characteristics. See, e.g., ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CON-
TRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM (1989); Ronald Coase, The Light-
house in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974).
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two sources of provision are acceptable substitutes for each other. Thus, pri-
vatization has typically taken the form of selling governmental assets to pri-
vate firms or replacement of a government provider with a private- one, either
through government abandonment of the service or through competitive bid-
ding between public and private providers. Examples include, for the first
case, governmental sales of airlines, forests, or communications facilities, and,
for the second case, government contracting for fire services or prison opera-
tions and competitive bidding for public defenders and ambulance services."
Frequently, some governmental involvement continues even after transition to
the private firm. But in such cases, the governmental role is to regulate or
cooperate with the private entity, rather than to compete with it.
In this article I examine a different element of "privatization" that does
not involve government displacement by the private sector. Instead, my con-
cern is with goods or services that are simultaneously offered by both the
public and private sectors. What characterizes the difference in providers is
that they offer different levels of the same service. Initially, the very existence
of competition between private and public provision would seem anomalous.
The fact that government provides a kind and level of service, typically paid
for by tax revenues collected from the citizenry at large, is presumed to serve
as a response to unmet demand from its constituents. But if that is the case,
then why should a critical mass of residents (sufficient to support a private
provider) desire to expend additional resources for a different level and kind
of service, especially where (as in the case of services financed through gener-
al taxation) 3 they must still pay for the publicly provided services of which
they do not partake? Nevertheless, the fact that we can easily call to mind
examples in which residents have opted out of the service level offered by
government-through the use of private schools, private security guards, or
privatized mail delivery-suggests that this apparent anomaly occurs with
substantial frequency. The source of the apparent anomaly may lie in any of
several conditions. First, those who seek additional services may prefer that
any of government provide the level that they personally desire, but a majority
of the electorate prefers the level that government actually provides. Second,
the government may provide a level of service that is inconsistent with the
preferences of a majority of constituents, but a discrete interest group has been
able to capture the decisionmaking process with respect to the level of that
service provided by government. Third, constituents might vary dramatically in
their preferences for the level of government provision of a service, so that a
majority agrees that the government should provide a level consistent with the
lowest common denominator, augmented by private supplementation in differ-
ent degrees for those who desire it. 4 Indeed, given the strong assumptions
12. See KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS 110-37 (1995); Jim
Flanagan & Susan Perkins, PubliclPrivate Competition in the City of Phoenix, Arizona, 11 GOV'T
FIN. REV. 7 (1995).
13. Simultaneous provision may be less puzzling in either of two situations. First, where the
public good or service is financed through user fees, so utilization of the services of one entity
does not require paying for the other, second, some jurisdictions credit payments made by constit-
uents to private providers for services that would otherwise be provided by public providers.
14. See Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Public Provision of Private Goods, 104 J. POL.
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required to have perfectly harmonious preferences among the residents of a
jurisdiction (roughly the assumptions of perfect mobility, financial indepen-
dence, availability of diverse communities, and no externalities), 5 one would
anticipate that residents of the same community frequently will have divergent
demands for public services.
In each of these situations, the case for opting out of the governmentally
supplied level of service proceeds from the desire to achieve one's preferences
privately where one is unable to satisfy them through the political process. At
least initially, this desire seems perfectly benign. After all, the decisions of an
individual to select one level of service rather than another in the private mar-
ket causes little comment. The fact that I prefer eating in full-service restau-
rants to fast-food restaurants does not generate much criticism. It is thus ini-
tially puzzling that more is made of the fact when people, in selecting a differ-
ent level of service, choose a private provider that offers a different level
rather than a public one, such as in the choice to attend private schools or to
live in a residential association that has a gated or guarded entrance rather
than to rely on public schools for education or solely on the local police for
protection. 6 Seen simply as matters of contract between citizens and private
providers, these latter arrangements presumptively increase welfare; the fact
that a private party successfully offers the service (such as where a land devel-
oper attracts homeowners by creating a residential association with by-laws
that require more aesthetic regulation than local zoning laws) indicates that
there is a demand for that level that is not being met by governmental provi-
sion and that satisfaction of that demand is welfare enhancing, at least to the
immediate parties. 7
In these situations, residents may obtain desired services through private
"clubs," the members of which share production costs and can exclude non-
members who either do not desire the services offered by the club or whom
the club does not wish to serve. 8 Assume, for instance, a community in
which a minority of residents desires a swimming pool. Barring altruism and
substantial differences in the intensity of those who favor and oppose a public-
ly funded pool, democratic voting would not produce a swimming pool for
these individuals. Nevertheless, if the minority residents have the resources to
construct a pool, they may be able to create a swimming club open only to
members who have paid the "tax" in the form of dues sufficient to support the
ECON. 57 (1996) (indicating that a majority would prefer a regime of government provision with
market supplements to government-only or private-only provisions).
15. These are essentially the assumptions of the Tiebout model, under which government
expenditures would be optimally allocated. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416 (1956).
16. These two examples illustrate that sometimes opting out of private provision is a com-
plete substitute for public, and sometimes private provision supplements the public. I explore the
implications of this distinction below.
17. Here I am assuming that when people contract for a level of service, they do so because
they believe that level is consistent with what is best for themselves, rather than out of some com-
mitment to the welfare of others. For a discussion of the possible lack of fit between preferences
and welfare, see Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241
(1973).
18. See TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIvE ACTION 63 (1992).
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pool. Because nonpayors can be excluded from the pool, by means of an
entranceway at which membership cards must be shown, private providers
have incentives to make the pool available, notwithstanding that it has some of
the characteristics of a public good, i.e., it is nonrival to the extent that it
allows multiple swimmers to enjoy the facility simultaneously.' 9
While clubs typically offer goods and services that are not otherwise
governmentally provided, the same logic suggests that clubs can offer goods
that are provided by government, but at a level of service other than what the
potential club members desire. For instance, individuals with a taste for more
rapid snow removal on residential streets than the locality might offer (e.g.,
because the locality places a priority on clearing major thoroughfares rather
than residential areas) may live on privatized streets where abutters collective-
ly contract privately for early snow removal.' Indeed, government sometimes
encourages the formation of clubs to provide higher levels of service by au-
thorizing the creation of business improvement districts that are statutorily
enabled to collect "dues" from members, including involuntary members, and
use the proceeds for functions such as street improvements, landscaping,
signage, security, traffic safety devices, bicycle paths, and off-street parking
facilities.2' Where the club is able to achieve the preferences of its members,
at least without cost to nonmembers, there initially seems even less reason
(other than envy)22 to object to diffeiential provision than there is with re-
spect to services offered only by market mechanisms, since purchasing addi-
tional services does not necessarily disadvantage those who do not make simi-
lar purchases. In the case of private providers in traditional markets (as in my
restaurant example above), the potential consumer cannot obtain anything
without active involvement in a transaction. Where the private provider offers
only a different level of service, however, failure to enter into a transaction
means that the resident still receives the level of service provided by the gov-
ernment, at least with respect to those services funded through general taxa-
tion.23 The fact that failure to bargain does not deprive one of access to some
level of a service might be thought to reinforce the propriety of opting out.
Indeed, the positive social consequences of opting out may involve more
than satisfying the preferences of individuals. The claims that privatization will
save production costs is typically attributed to economies of scale or reduced
19. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 150-52 (1989).
20. 1 discuss the theory of clubs as a justification for strict construction of covenants in resi-
dential associations in Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CH. L.
REV. 1375, 1391 (1994).
21. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-1201 (Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-4015
(1991); 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1623 (Supp. 1996). On the collection of "dues" from unwilling
participants, see, e.g., Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Ct. App. 1992); Jensen v.
City & County of Denver, 806 P.2d 381 (Colo. 1991).
22. On envy, see JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SocIETY 252-63 (1989).
23. Services funded by user fees may require that residents actually request the service. But
other forms of exaction do not require affirmative action by residents. For instance, services paid
for through special assessmepts, such as some street paving, may be imposed even if the benefi-
ciary never uses the service, because the benefit accrues to the property assessed and not to the
individual payor. See, e.g., Owatonna v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 450 F.2d 87 (8th
Cir. 1971).
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agency costs in the private sector (resulting in part from better incentives to
monitor) as a function of the capacity of private owners to claim residual
profits of the firm. But any increased efficiency in private provision may be
attributable less to the nature of the provider (public or private) than to the
presence of competition.25 The simultaneous presence of public and private
providers of different levels of service may improve the performance of each,
since each has an interest in attracting customers of the other. Finally, opting
out should even return benefits to those who subscribe only to the background
levels of service, i.e., that level provided by government, since segregation by
demand for service allows the jurisdiction's residents to form homogeneous
groups that can avoid difficulties, such as cycling among voters, that are asso-
ciated with heterogeneous populations.26
These consequences might be thought to make any effort by private pro-
viders to offer goods and services that the government could, but has chosen
not to, make available to constituents relatively noncontroversial. Nevertheless,
it is just the cases .in which residents with different preferences have formed
clubs for local public goods that create controversy. The private institutions to
which people seeking to opt out have migrated are consistently under attack as
exclusionary and elitist, if not unconstitutional, and are accused of either dilut-
ing the level of services available to those who have not opted out or of in-
creasing costs to those others by making them bear a disproportionate burden
of serving those excluded from the club.27 These criticisms reflect two
24. See, e.g., DIETER 11os, PRIVATIZATION: A THEoRETICAL TREATMENT 33-50 (1991);
Michael Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing,
75 CORNELL L. REv. 878 (1990).
25. See DONAHUE, supra note 10, at 67-68. Donahue contends that perusal of studies com-
paring the costs of private and public provision of the same service reveals that competition, rather
than public or private supply, is the best determinant of efficiency. See also Thomas E.
Borcherding et al., Comparing the Efficiency of Private and Public Production: A Survey of the
Evidence from Five Federal States, ZEITscHRIFr FUER NATIONALOKONOMIE [J. Econ.], Supp. 2,
127-56 (1982), where the authors conclude:
The literature seems to indicate that (a) private production is cheaper than production in
publicly owned and managed finms, and (b) given sufficient competition between public
and private producers (and no discriminative regulations and subsidies), the difference in
unit costs turns out to be insignificant. From this we may conclude that it is not so much
the difference in the transferability of ownership but the lack of competition which leads
to the often observed less efficient production in public firms.
Id. at 136.
These studies assume provision at equal levels by public and private entities. My concern is
less with efficient provision of a given level of service than with competition between public and
private about the level of service provided.
26. See MUELLER, supra note 19, at 393. It might be ideal, from the perspective of sorting
for service provision, if potential residents could signal their preferences in advance of moving to
jurisdictions or if jurisdictions could precommit to a level of service that would attract like-minded
residents. We would then see a better fit of residents and services that would minimize the costs
related to opting out. This is the intuition behind Boudreaux and Holcombe's view of residential
associations as "contractual governments" that reduce transaction costs of bargaining for a set of
public goods or for a set of procedural rules to determine which goods will be provided. See Don-
ald J. Boudreaux & Randall G. Holcombe, Government by Contract, 17 PUB. FIN. Q. 264 (1989);
Donald J. Boudreaux and Randall G. Holcombe, Contractual Governments in Theory and Practice
(1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
27. The primary target of the attack is often residential community associations. See, e.g.,
EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA (1994); Daniel A. Bell, Residential Community Associations: Corn-
1190 [Vol. 73:4
OPTING OUT OF PUBLIC PROVISION
concerns. One concern is that certain characteristics of public provision are
themselves valuable, presumably by embodying a procedure that is not reflect-
ed in privatized decisionmaking.28 That criticism seems particularly telling
where the private alternative is selected by those who are unable to achieve
their preferences in the political market, rather than where private alternatives
simply reflect wide variations of preferences above a generally accepted mini-
mum. The other concern, which seems implicit in much of the criticism of
opting out, but that I hope to make more explicit and to examine more closely,
is that the practice imposes more tangible political costs on those who accept
only the background level of service. The extent of these costs may depend on
the motivations for opting out that I mentioned above. If, for instance, those
who opt out do so because political markets do not provide their preferred
level of service (either because they are outvoted or because the decisionmaki-
ng process has been captured), then opting out may reduce the chances of
forming a coalition that would change the background level. On the other
hand, if opting out is a response to variation in the demand for public goods,
those with relatively low and relatively high demand may seek to keep gov-
ernmental expenditures relatively low, in order to avoid subsidizing large num-
bers of individuals who favor different levels of service. In any of these cases,
the competitive benefits created by the availability of private options must be
balanced against the political costs that interfere with government provision at
a level consistent with resident preferences.
If we believed that the level of public goods provision was determined by
consideration of all relevant interests, then any concern that some residents
were dissatisfied would simply be the inevitable result of democratic
decisionmaking. In short, motivations for opting out would consistently fall
within the first, relatively benign, condition set forth above, i.e., individuals
would opt out because a majority of residents preferred a different level of
service. My present concern, therefore, is with the ways in which the mix of
public and private provision affects the composition of interests that are con-
sidered in decisionmaking about the level of provision for a public good. The
fact that the goods at issue share some "public goods" characteristics suggests
that they may be provided best when provided collectively.29 But those same
munity or Disunity?, 5 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 25 (Fall 1995); David J. Kennedy, Note, Resi-
dential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities, on Nonmem-
bers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995). A related attack may be directed at business improvement dis-
tricts (BIDs). If these entities hire private security forces to remove "undesirables" from the area,
those who are removed will migrate to less hostile areas, i.e., those that have not or cannot create
BIDs, and these areas will have to bear a greater burden related to having a larger population of
"undesirables."
28. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Who Puts the Public in the Public Good?, 71 MARQ. L.
REV. 534, 548-50 (1988); Paul Starr, The Case for Skepticism, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTER-
NATIVES 25 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991).
29. I am not suggesting that goods with "public" characteristics cannot be supplied by the
market. Indeed, there is much reason to suggest that private providers will produce public goods.
See, e.g., DE JASAY, supra note 11. But private provision means that the amount of the good pro-
vided will correspond to the interests of the private provider, which may deviate from the interests
of the public. Of course, as the next sentences of the text indicate, public providers may also sup-
ply goods in amounts that deviate from the interests of the public. My modest claim at this point
is that in at least some cases, the latter deviation will be smaller than the former.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
characteristics and the susceptibility to collective provision suggest that the
good or service will be available only when a political coalition forms to
signal public officials of the preferred service level, since traditional problems
of collective action deter the statement of individual preferences for public
goods. Political coalitions, however, notoriously misrepresent the public's
interest, in large part because joining or forming a coalition is itself a public
good.30 The consequence is that if those who opt out would otherwise join
competing coalitions that are more representative of the collective will, the
social costs of opting out may be considerable. In that case, those who disfa-
vor voluntary arrangements would not simply be acting out of envy; rather,
now they would realistically fear that those voluntary arrangements actually
conflict with the provision of services to those who remain.
There will, however, be situations in which opting out imposes no or
negligible costs on those who accept the background level of service. Thus,
wholesale condemnation or endorsement of opting out is inappropriate. My
concern here is to identify those characteristics of goods that would tend to
increase or decrease either the political costs or the competitive benefits of
opting out so that, with respect to any particular good or service, we could
determine more readily the desirability of opting out. Even if I were successful
at completing a typology of factors that tended towards increased political
costs or competitive benefits, I am not confident that it would provide a solu-
tion to the issue of opting out. As I discuss later in this article, one of the
concerns about opting out is that reducing homogeneity among services inher-
ently reduces the sense of community among residents of a jurisdiction. I am
less convinced of the force of this claim than some, but I credit it sufficiently
to conclude that weighing political costs and competitive benefits cannot be
looked at in isolation in determining the propriety of opting out.
Most of my examples focus on the area with which I am most familiar,
the provision of services by local governments. Nevertheless, the principles
that I suggest do or ought to inform the debate about private contracting
around public provision should remain the same regardless of the level of
government serving as the background provider. But the focus on local
government does pose one anomaly. One of the features that makes decentral-
ized government most attractive is its capacity to offer different packages of
goods and services and thus to appeal to the various preferences of different
actors who can, with relative ease, migrate to jurisdictions that offer the pack-
age that is most attractive. Opting out plays very much the same role, although
the mechanism for registering preferences is now through contracting with
private providers rather than through physical exit to another locality. Thus, to
the extent that we believe that opting out generates undesirable political costs,
we implicitly question the desirability of decentralization generally.3 Nev-
ertheless, there may be important distinctions between opting out contractually
and through physical exit. For instance, if our ultimate objective is the
30. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 50-54 (1994).
31. For a critique of unfettered decentralization, see Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentraliza-
tion, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 253 (1993).
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maintenance of community, we may be less concerned about opting out
through physical exit to another community, notwithstanding the disruptive
effect that physical movement has on community continuity. When a resident
moves, the loss from membership in one community is offset by the gain in
membership to another. Opting out through contract while remaining a phys-
ical resident of the community does not necessarily produce the same offset-
ting benefit. Yet to the extent that any decentralized delivery of services pro-
duces other effects that I discuss herein, we may need to rethink the priority
that much of local government law scholarship gives to the value of smaller
governmental units.
A final introductory point relates to the nature of the public goods them-
selves. Governments provide an array of goods and services that range from
the essential to the convenient. Our reaction to opting out may reflect the
relative importance that we attribute to the service at issue, especially where
we face substantial uncertainty in trying to quantify or balance the competitive
benefits and political costs of opting out. In the face of such uncertainty, we
may be more willing, for example, to risk excess political costs in the provi-
sion of a municipal golf course than in the provision of public education.
Again, a typology of factors that tends towards increasing political costs or
competitive benefits, standing alone, seems inadequate to the ultimate task of
determining our reactions to opting out with respect to any particular service.
Nevertheless, I believe that trying to isolate factors that might be used in any
such typology will significantly advance our thinking about the issue and help
us understand our different reactions to individual pursuit of preferences in
different contexts.
II. GOVERNMENT PROVISION AS A DEFAULT
A. Majoritarian Defaults and Their Implications
There would be little reason for concern about opting out if we be-
lieved that government generally delivered service levels consistent with the
preferences of the majority of its constituents. If that were the case, then those
who opt out are presumably idiosyncratic. Allowing opting out under these
circumstances would appear, at least initially, to evince neither capture of the
decisionmaking process nor the imposition of substantial political costs on
those who accept the background level. Instead, opting out would only repre-
sent the inevitable dissatisfaction with government provision that some would
feel, given that governmental decisions are made in gross rather than through
highly tailored transactions with individual constituents.
Redistributional concerns aside, government appropriately intervenes in
market transactions to overcome obstacles that inhibit consumers from signal-
ing their preferences or that inhibit potential providers from meeting the sig-
naled demand. Governmental intervention to correct these market failures
typically does not take the form of individually dickered contracts. Instead,
general purpose governments" provide a package of goods and services to all
32. Special purpose governments, such as authorities and special districts may be even closer
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constituents and exact payments in the form of taxes that are charged to indi-
viduals regardless of whether they utilize the proffered goods and services.
These same governments offer other services to all constituents, whether re-
quested or not, but impose charges or user fees only for the service utilized by
or made available to the payor.33 Whether the package offered is sufficiently
consistent with constituent needs is ideally determined by markets that trade in
votes rather than in dollars. Initial governmental involvement in these activi-
ties, however, seeks the same objective as market transactions-to provide
individuals the goods and services they desire at prices that reflect their cost.
Once we recognize that government cannot perfectly replicate the results
of private markets, permitting those who could attain greater satisfaction
through individualized transactions seems plausible. This is not to say that
market transactions perfectly meet all private wants. Transactions in private
markets are costly to construct. Suppliers and purchasers must seek each other
out and bargain over prices and risks. Reducing these costs is typically seen as
a benefit, even if the result is to constrain choice in individual transactions.
Thus, private markets offer ready-made goods designed to cater to the desires
of a substantial number of, but not all, potential purchasers. Those whose pref-
erences are not a precise "fit" with the off-the-rack selection would prefer the
slight misfit to incurring the costs of more individually tailored bargains. Thus,
clothing comes in predetermined sizes even though there are people who are
"somewhere between" a size 38 and a size 39. New automobiles come with a
pre-set array of features, or "standard options" that some buyers would prefer
not to purchase. Restaurants offer entrees accompanied by a previously estab-
lished set of side dishes. In each of these cases, it is possible for those who
desire a precise fit to bargain away from the off-the-rack selection. Clothes
can be custom made, automobile options can be ordered, restaurants may
substitute rice for potatoes on request. The party seeking the change, however,
must bargain for it, and frequently must incur additional costs involved in
meeting the request.3" In each case, then, the pre-determined selection consti-
tutes a default away from which the parties to the particular transaction can
contract. Each of these defaults is presumably set to appeal to a broad range
of potential consumers (hopefully a substantial majority), thus minimizing the
costs that would attach to highly stylized transactions.
to market transactions in that they provide only a single service, traditionally supported by user
fees rather than taxes. Government involvement in such activities may offer fewer advantages over
market transactions. See CLAYTON P. GiLLETrE, PUBLIC ATrHORITIES AND PRIVATE FSRMS AS
PROVIDERS OF PUBLIC GOODS, REASON FOUNDATION POLICY STUDY No. 180 (1994). Neverthe-
less, it is conceivable that governmental involvement in such activities effectively reduces transac-
tion costs (by providing a mechanism for collective production and payment for goods that would
otherwise require substantial organization among diffuse individuals, such as a toll bridge),
internalizes externalities, or solves the collective action problem that interferes with the supply of
goods that are nonexclusive and nonrival.
33. Some non-tax governmental exactions may be imposed on parties who do not or cannot
directly utilize the underlying service, on the theory that the benefit made available by the govern-
ment increases the value of the constituent's property and thus justifies governmental charges in
the form of cost recovery. See supra note 12.
34. Even then, we have all had the experience of finding a favorite product discontinued,
presumably because an inadequate number of others shared our tastes.
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To the extent that legal rules offer a means of allocating transactional
risks, analogous to the allocation of characteristics that are the focus of mass
marketed products, the same principles suggest that these rules should also
align with majoritarian preferences. As in product markets, legal default rules
seek to reduce transaction costs by conferring on parties allocations for which
they would presumably bargain if left to their own devices.35 While these de-
faults may not fit perfectly with personal preferences, the savings in negotia-
tions warrants acceptance of less than ideal terms for all parties. Thus, Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides background rules around which
the parties are free to negotiate, but that apply in the absence of any contrary
agreement.36 Default rules thus differ from mandatory rules, which parties
may not adjust even if they desire. In order to achieve this reduction in trans-
action costs, default rules must reflect the terms for which a majority (or at
least a plurality) of parties would bargain. Failure to generate majoritarian
rules means that there is some alternative rule (the one that would satisfy
majority preferences) that would reduce transaction costs even more than the
one reflected in the default.
Recall that-at least for tax-supported services such as police protection,
road paving, or admission to most public parks-governments offer a back-
ground level of service to all constituents without any additional bargain. It is
tempting to consider this level of service as equivalent to a default rule under
contract law. Once a community decides to offer a service, residents are enti-
tled to a certain level of that service simply by virtue of their membership in
that community. The background level of service thus may be thought to serve
the same function as preordained product characteristics or legal rules that ap-
ply to parties in a particular relationship who do not explicitly bargain for a
contrary legal outcome. Assuming, as suggested above, that individuals gravi-
tate toward jurisdictions that hold themselves out as offering a package of
goods and services, the package offered by any jurisdiction should be consis-
tent with the preferences of a significant percentage of that jurisdiction.
Whether or not such a conclusion is appropriate depends on whether those
who gravitate to a particular community do tend to have similar, if not identi-
cal interests; that is, if we believe that the Tiebout assumptions for the provi-
sions of local public goals work well enough to define in general terms the
sorting of residents among jurisdictions. The assumptions of that model sug-
gest that we should see substantial homogeneity in the preferences of residents
of any decentralized government." The smaller the jurisdiction, the more
35. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 588 (1977); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983).
Alternative explanations include forcing persons with superior information to reveal that informa-
tion to contracting parties. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). For a compendium and critique of
arguments about non-majoritarian default rules, see Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm
and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 389 (1993).
36. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(a) (1990) (assigning risk of shipment loss).
37. Homogeneity, however, is not the only way of producing an equilibrium in which every-
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homogeneous the population of the jurisdiction would tend to be, and the
greater similarity we would expect to see in the preferences of residents.
Given the variety of services and service levels that any government might
provide, individuals with mobility will not want to gravitate to jurisdictions in
which they must pay for services that they neither enjoy nor desire. Thus, we
would expect that mobile individuals will tend to migrate to jurisdictions that
provide preferred services.3" The result is that jurisdictions will attract indi-
viduals who are relatively like-minded, at least with respect to governmental
services. In addition, we would then expect to see little in the way of opting
out because residents would presumptively be satisfied with the default level
of service.
Application of the contractual default model to governmental services
implies that, if the level of government provision were set to satisfy
majoritarian wants, no negative implications should be drawn from the fact
that some individuals within the jurisdiction opt for a different level of service.
If the analogy to default rules holds, parties who bargain out would be charac-
terized solely by the idiosyncratic nature of their preferences, not by any self-
ishness or the desire to impose costs on those who accept the background
level. Majoritarian rules in contract law or in designing mass-marketed prod-
ucts do not depend on any deontological underpinning for their currency.39
Bargaining out of default rules betokens (tautologically) only that those are the
rules selected by a majority, and the person seeking an alternative is not part
of that majority.' Far from reflecting some moral norm, default rules may be
irrational (such as where they are based on commonly shared biases or low-
probability events)4' or antisocial insofar as they impose costs on non-parties,
notwithstanding that they increase the wealth of the parties to the bargain
(imagine, for instance, a price-fixing default rule). Nor would opting out imply
the disruption of potential coalitions for change, since any such coalitions
would either be unnecessary (since the level of provision would be consistent
one prefers his or her community to all others. Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests how heterogeneous
populations could also produce an inefficient, but stable, equilibrium. For instance, in a universe
of two towns and ten people, five of whom are high demanders of public goods and five of whom
are low demanders, equilibrium could be reached either by sorting the high demanders and low
demanders in separate towns or by having two towns of five high and five low demanders, where
each town produces identical levels of public services. Any shift by a resident of one town to the
other town would make the resident better off (by tipping the voting balance) only at the cost of
making members of the new minority worse off. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Model-
ing the Political Economy of Local Government, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE
TiEBOuT MODEL AFrER TWEerY-FIVE YEARS 55, 58-59 (George R. Zodrow ed., 1983).
38. Endowment effects suggest that even among mobile residents, many will form preferenc-
es based on what is available to them where they currently reside. Thus, they will not gravitate to
a jurisdiction that would be more appealing if they had no prior preferences.
39. For a view that default rules ought to be rooted in concepts of fairness, see Steven J.
Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCI-
PLINARY L.J. 115 (1993). For a response, see Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in
Contractual Defaults, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 167 (1993).
40. This may be weaker than is necessary. Default rules may also betoken efficiency if the
default arises out of repeated negotiations between similarly situated parties and the negotiations
tend to generate the same allocation of risks that is reflected in the rule.
41. See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for
Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990).
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with majoritarian preferences) or superfluous (since those dissatisfied with the
level of service provision could migrate to more hospitable jurisdictions).
Allowing persons to opt out of public provision, therefore, might be no
more momentous than allowing opting out of default rules in contract. Within
a jurisdiction, those who seek a level of service different from the background
level provided by government may, but again, must bargain for a different
level of service. Indeed, typically, that bargain must take place with a third
party. Governments rarely offer a menu of service levels from which residents
can select. To the contrary, once government provides a service to any constit-
uent, the legal doctrine of equal service provision presumptively obligates the
government to offer the same level of service to all residents.42 Provision of
differential levels of service within the same jurisdiction is typically seen as a
basis for complaint. As a matter of legal doctrine, the delivery of a higher
level of service to the wealthy side of town rather than to the poor side of
town is considered an inequity to be remedied, often by judicial intervention,
rather than an indication of disparate preferences.43 It is only the infrequent
case in which governments offer residents a choice among service levels. A
student in public school, for example, may decide whether to take courses
oriented toward college or vocational training. The set of cases expands if we
mean by different levels of "the same" service any governmental function in
which residents can choose how much to consume. Then, virtually any good
financed through user fees or service charges will qualify as differentially
provided. A municipal gas company will sell as much gas as any user wants,
so that one user may obtain 100 cubic feet while another purchases 200 cubic
feet (and pays twice as much). If the concern is qualitative rather than quanti-
tative, however, there does not appear to be any difference in demand between
the two users in that (assuming ability to pay) each has equal access to the
service.
Some financing mechanisms employed by government explicitly make
possible the satisfaction of dissimilar preferences among residents. Special
assessments or special benefit taxes, for instance, allow those who seek a level
of service different from what is otherwise offered to obtain that objective, as
long as they are willing to bear the relevant costs. Thus, street paving may be
generally unavailable from government, except on petition of a critical mass of
abutters who petition the city for the service and indicate their willingness to
pay for it." Distributional effects would follow where some, but not all,
42. Veach v. City of Phoenix, 427 P.2d 335, 336 (Ariz. 1967).
43. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services,
100 HARV. L. REv. 946 (1987). For cases involving judicial intervention to address allegations of
unequal service provision, see Mlikotin v. City of Los Angeles, 643 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1981);
Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 89 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1952). Such cases are also
brought on the basis of claims of racial, not wealth, discrimination. See Ammons v. Dade City,
783 F.2d 982 (11 th Cir. 1986). For an examination of unequal service provision within cities, see
Carl S. Shoup, Rules for Distributing a Free Government Service Among Areas of a City, 42
NAT'L TAX J. 103 (1989).
44. See, e.g., KENNErH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNrrED STATES (1985). Jackson indicates that certain services were made available differentially
within the same municipality:
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constituents lacked the resources to contract for their desired level of service.
But, since those effects will exist whether the source of inequality is a public
or private provider, their presence does not help us to determine the propriety
of opting out.
4
We see additional examples of menus at the federal level.' Postal servic-
es offer one rate for first class, another for overnight mail. An overnight visi-
tor to a national park may choose to sleep in a campground at one rate, and at
a governmentally operated (or franchised) hotel for another. But aside from
these rare cases of menus, constituents do not select among service levels
from governmental providers. One does not, for instance, receive a default
level of police services simply by virtue of paying local property taxes but
then receive an option to obtain an additional level of police protection on
payment of an additional sum. Thus, one who desires more of a service than is
offered generally must find a private provider. One who seeks more security
than is offered to citizens generally typically hires a private security guard or
resides behind private walls. One who seeks more religious training in educa-
tion typically hires private tutors or sends a child to parochial school rather
than pay additional fees to the public school system.
B. Background Service Levels as Majoritarian Defaults
My assumption to this point has been that the background level of service
can be considered as a majoritarian default rule, so that individual efforts to
opt out are idiosyncratic and confer negligible harm on others. If this assump-
tion is untrue, if the background level of service does not reflect majority
preferences within the jurisdiction, there may be substantial implications for
the propriety of allowing individuals to opt out of public provision. Those
implications, however, simultaneously cut in different directions. Opting out
might be considered more appropriate because it signals officials that they
have misread the popular will and creates opportunities for political entrepre-
neurs who are more attentive to the majority's preferences. Thus, opting out
would create competition that should generate efficiency gains. Opting out,
however, may be a second-best solution to the problem of official failure to
satisfy majority preferences. Direct political appeals by those who would oth-
erwise opt out, e.g., through the formation of political coalitions to alter the
level of provision, might be preferable to the relatively haphazard process of
Before the Civil War, streets were paved or widened when owners of a certain percent-
age (usually three-fourths) of the property facing the right-of-way petitioned the city to
do so. To finance such improvements, property-owners "abutting and directly affected"
paid special assessments. The municipal government played a limited role: the basic
decisions as to when and how to pave were made by private individuals.
Id. at 131.
45. Interestingly, special assessment funding appears to have declined as a basis for munici-
pal improvements. See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation:
Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1983).
46. We would expect to see a more centralized level of government offering more menus,
since its constituency should have a more varied set of preferences than a decentralized govern-
ment. Of course, these varied preferences might be handled by allowing constituents to opt out of
the service level set by the centralized government.
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signaling dissatisfaction and hoping that a political entrepreneur receives and
acts on the signal. Thus, opting out may be less appropriate if it reduces the
impact of individuals who are willing to lobby for the level of services that
the majority prefers.
In light of these effects, it is necessary to consider whether background
levels can be treated as simple default rules that imply majoritarian prefer-
ences. Given the assumptions of the Tiebout model, it would seem paradoxical
for the background level of service offered by a government not to reflect the
preferences of a majority of constituents."' I have referred above to one plau-
sible reason why this result may occur. Given the public goods nature of the
services with which I am concerned, and the public goods nature of the lobby-
ing efforts that will be employed to indicate levels of services to political
officials, one would expect that dominant interest groups would successfully
seek idiosyncratic levels of their preferred services.
There exists, however, a more robust explanation of why the default rule
model does not easily fit the delivery of municipal services. That explanation
concerns the inability to provide a background level to any stable majority
view. This inability stems from two sources. First, note that contractual default
rules allocate risks between parties in a manner that is likely to be binary in
nature. Risk of loss is typically allocated to buyer or to seller; battles of forms
will either generate binding contracts or they will not. Loss sharing rules are
exceptional. One consequence of this binary choice is that a majority of parties
is likely to prefer one allocation to the other. Any given government service,
however, can typically be provided on a continuum, rather than in a binary
manner. Even where the level of service provided by government corresponds
to the preferences of the median voter,' there is no reason to believe that the
median voter is likely to represent the views of a majority, or even those of a
substantial plurality. Instead, the median voter reflects only that point that can
attract more support than any other position in a winner-take-all contest. The
fact that others will "go along" with a median position in order to avoid shifts
to even more disfavored positions, however, does not entail that the median
voter represents the first choice of a majority of the relevant constituents.
Nevertheless, taken in combination with the Tiebout theory, which suggests
that local governments will attract a population with homogeneous preferences,
a proposition for which there is at least some empirical support,49 there is a
47. For survey evidence that individuals choose places of residence for reasons other than
the available services of this proposition, inconsistent with the Tiebout model, see David P.
Varady, Determinants of Residential Mobility Decisions, APAJ, June 1983, at 184.
48. The premise of the median voter principle is
simply an observation that a decisive coalition in a one-person one-vote democracy
consists of the median voter plus all voters either to the left or to the right of that voter.
For example, the conservative must start from the right and reach far enough to the left
to bring in the median voter. The liberal starts from the left and must reach far enough
to the fight to bring in the same voter. The election then becomes a fight for that median
voter.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation History as Politics or Markets, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 554
(1995). For an assumption that local government service provision shifts with the identity of the
median voter, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models of Local Government: Exit, Voting, and
the Market, 6 J. URB. ECON. 319, 329 (1979)
49. See Edward M. Gramlich & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Micro Estimates of Public Spending
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greater possibility that the median voter will represent something close to a
majority view.
The second impediment to providing services consistent with the prefer-
ences of a stable majority arises from the fact that public budgets tend to be
multidimensional, so that different pieces of the budget pie can be increased or
decreased while retaining the same total expenditure. Reference to the prefer-
ences of the median voter might make sense if the level of each governmental
service were decided independently. Under that condition, residents are likely
to have single-peaked preferences with respect to individual goods and servic-
es. Voters in general-purpose governments, ° however, register their prefer-
ences on a package of public goods and services simultaneously since they
vote for officials, not for individual goods and services.5 A voter in a local
election who is satisfied with the locality's level of education, garbage collec-
tion, and snow removal might vote to re-elect local officials, even if the voter
was dissatisfied with the level of local cable television regulation. The fact
that services must be voted on as a package means that officials will be unable
to disaggregate from voting results those service levels that satisfy a majority
of voters from those that do not. Indeed, the same process reduces the chance
that any package will appeal to a majority, since small tradeoffs among
different services could shift preferences or produce cycling among packages.
For instance, a majority formed by advocacy of one level of spending on a
package of police services, welfare services, and educational services could be
displaced by another majority that traded more welfare services for fewer
educational services. As a result, there is unlikely to be a stable majority that
prefers any particular package, even if there exist majorities with respect to
individual services.52
Of course, even where is simultaneous voting on multidimensional issues,
there are substitutes for voting that allow officials to hear complaints or praise
about the level of provision with respect to particular services. Direct com-
plaint, or "voice" in the vernacular,53 provides an alternative opportunity for
voters to inform political leaders that their decisions deviate from constituent
preferences. We rely on these political substitutes for voting when we speak of
political coalitions that can make their preferences known. But there is no
reason to believe that these alternatives will reflect majoritarian or widespread
interests. Indeed, just the opposite is true. Given the characteristics of the
public goods that government is providing, those in the majority are most
Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses, 90 J. POL. ECON. 536
(1982). Gramlich and Rubinfeld find support for the median-voter hypothesis in the substantial
number of survey respondents who want no change in the overall level of local public spending.
While these results are consistent with the median-voter hypothesis, they do not demonstrate that
voters want no change in spending for any individual service. In addition, endowment effects may
skew the responses.
50. Single-purpose governments, such as authorities and special districts, may be more ap-
propriate for the median-voter analysis.
51. See James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Rep-
resentative Government, in JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD E. WAGNER, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONsTrrtrrONAL ECONOMICS 10 (1988).
52. See DENNIS MUELLER, CONSTrruTIONAL DEMOCRACY 199-21 (1996).
53. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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likely to be able to free ride on the efforts of others. Thus, one would antici-
pate that complaints and praise would issue from those who suffered or en-
joyed the most salient consequences from the level of provision and who were
least able to rely on others to represent their interests. For instance, debates
concerning levels of educational funding may be dominated by teacher groups
and administrators who want to maximize budgets. As long as the level of
service demanded by those with idiosyncratic preferences is not so costly as to
disrupt the entire package on which all constituents vote, officials have incen-
tives to satisfy the preferences of these idiosyncratic interests. Doing so gains
officials the support of those with intense interests, without alienating the
support of those still relatively satisfied with the overall package of goods and
services. The necessary result is that where the level of each service within the
package is decided simultaneously, the level of any given service is even less
likely to reflect the interests of the median voter or of the majority.
These consequences are likely to be exacerbated in some ways, but dimin-
ished in others, when we move from decentralized to more centralized govern-
ments. Madisonian theory suggests that we are more likely to see competition
among interest groups at centralized levels, where entrepreneurial leaders are
more likely to arise and the chances of finding enough interested parties to
create an effective coalition is enhanced. Decentralized decisionmaking, on the
contrary, is more likely to be dominated by a monopolistic interest group.
Thus, we might expect decisionmaking at the centralized level on any one
issue would be more consistent with the views of the median voter, though
still not consistent with the desires of a majority. At the same time, the vari-
ance of interests within the nation is likely to be greater than the variance of
interests within any given community in the nation, again assuming that the
Tiebout model accurately predicts relative homogeneity within localities. Thus,
where discrete interest groups do not face competition at the centralized level,
we might expect that the level of public goods that are centrally provided will
be less likely to reflect the interests of the median voter. National defense, for
instance, is traditionally viewed as a public good whose supply is properly
determined at a centralized level. Nevertheless, Boston residents would want
more expenditures on naval defense than Omaha residents. But if Omaha resi-
dents do not see naval expenditures as a direct tradeoff for other expenditures
they would prefer, e.g., agricultural subsidies, they may not coalesce to defeat
what, from a national perspective, is an overexpenditure on naval defense.
The result is that we are unlikely to see expenditures that reflect the pref-
erences of the median voter on issues where there are substantial variations in
preferences for the service and in intensity for different quantities (or qualities)
of the service. Instead, we would expect the default level of service to reflect
the preferences of a discrete, yet dominant minority. Then the analogy be-
tween opting out of default rules in contract and opting out of public provision
dissolves. Whereas in contract law opting out is the signal of idiosyncratic
behavior, opting out with respect to publicly provided services may actually be
the preference of a substantial majority.
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C. The Use and Costs of Opting Out as a Signal
What should we infer about the propriety of opting out if we conclude
that the background level of service does not reflect majoritarian preferences?
First, the lack of fit between the background level of service and majoritarian
preferences suggests that opting out is even more appropriate in these circum-
stances, because-as I discuss below-opting out cannot be opposed on the ar-
gument that doing so removes one from the core of the community. Second, it
plausibly emits a more highly tailored signal than the opaque signals of elec-
toral markets, clouded by multidimensional choices, that there is constituent
dissatisfaction with the background level of service. Thus, the objection to the
analogy between contract default rules and public service levels may turn out
not to be an objection to opting out, but instead a basis of support for the
practice.
If the above is true, then it might tell an optimistic story about opting out,
since it provides reasons to believe that opting out plays a productive role,
providing competition that obligates the government provider to be attentive to
the demands of its constituents, without imposing significant political costs in
the form of diluting coalitions or commonalities. Indeed, where opting out is
available, the signal to officials may be effective even where those who exer-
cise the option constitute a small minority, since the resulting signal would be
that the current level of provision is acceptable to most residents.
Nevertheless, the signal emitted by opting out itself contains some
opaqueness. Opting out may have limited reliability as a signal because the
decision to select a level of service other than the background level may re-
flect dissatisfaction with one feature of the service, and that feature may vary
for different parties. Those who opt for private schools rather than public may
not be concerned that the budget for education is inadequate. Rather, one
group may believe that too much of it is spent on programs for the disadvan-
taged or on teachers' salaries and not enough on football teams or on pro-
grams for the gifted. Others who opt out of the same system may do so be-
cause insufficient time is dedicated to religious education or to traditional
reading programs. Similarly, residents may be satisfied with the level of
spending on police services but believe that not enough of the police budget is
spent on foot patrols. The difficulty is that officials cannot easily distill the
reasons why different people opt out and thus have little basis for translating
the act of opting out into a signal of a specific source of dissatisfaction.
Whether we want to employ this signaling device, therefore, may depend on
whether we believe that there exist offsetting costs and whether we can define
discrete instances when those costs would be outweighed by the benefits of
opting out.
These limitations on the value of opting out must be considered when
weighing the benefits of the practice against the costs that private options may
impose. If the net result of opting out is to threaten the coalition for shifts in
service levels, then we might want to encourage alternative means of register-
ing complaint that retain the political participation of potential emigrants. If,
for instance, those likely to opt out would otherwise be most likely to monitor
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public officials or to become political entrepreneurs for the preferred service
level, we might want them to remain customers of the public provider. At
least, that would be the case if we thought that, once they opt out, these indi-
viduals will have a less intense interest in monitoring the conduct of officials.
That seems to be a reasonable assumption. Monitoring is a costly activity, so
that we would imagine the task would be undertaken by those who had the
most to lose should public officials misbehave (i.e., behave in ways that are
inconsistent with the interests of the monitors). To the extent that they reflect
the preferences of others, use of voice options by this group means that they
would presumptively "raise all boats" when increasing services for themselves.
But once potential monitors are no longer receiving publicly available benefits,
they have little incentive to ensure that the background level is consistent with
public preferences.
The political costs of opting out are more likely to materialize if dissatis-
fied constituents have independent reasons to favor exit over voice. Where the
background level of service is determined by capture of the local decision-
making process rather than majority preferences (or even median voters),
effective exercise of voice requires creation of countervailing interest groups.
This effort, however, necessarily suffers from traditional collective action
problems that reduce the likelihood that any complainer will be successful.
Indeed, the very presence of an exit option deters membership in potential
coalitions because the cooperation of others cannot be assured. Thus, opting
out may be a less costly option than voice. Even if exit is more costly than
voice (because it requires contracting with a private party for a privatized
substitute), a dissatisfied resident may choose the former because exit also
increases the certainty of obtaining the desired good. The existence of the
alternative market eliminates the need to rely on the participation of others to
obtain the desired level of service, so that the expected value of investing in
costly exit may be higher than the expected value of investing in voice."4
If we want to induce those capable of exiting to remain within or to join a
coalition for changing the background level, we may pursue either (or a com-
bination) of two strategies. First, we could raise the costs of exit, up to the
point of prohibition. Assume, for instance, that we believe that public transpor-
tation is inadequate, but that those who can afford cars will not lobby for
better mass transit (even though better mass transit might reduce congestion on
the roads), and without their participation we would not expect efforts for
better public transportation to be successful. If private cars were banned in the
central city, however, we would anticipate that former drivers would join the
lobbying effort for better public transportation.
We rarely explicitly employ this strategy of prohibiting opting out. Even
where we mandate participation in a collective enterprise, the obligation typi-
cally requires a minimum contribution, but does not preclude additional
54. The increased certainty that exit provides for achieving a desired good is discussed in
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 53, at 37-39; see also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The
Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 137
(1996).
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contributions, even though supplements return more personal than collective
benefit. I may augment my Social Security payments with contributions to
retirement plans, I may volunteer for more military service than is required, or
I may purchase more automobile insurance than the statutory requirement.
Opting out, however, can be deterred without being prohibited. When
trying to decide which level of government should provide a good or service,
it is commonplace to note that centralized provision makes it more difficult to
avoid making contributions by physical exit. Thus, redistributive services are
perhaps best provided by more centralized governments, so that those from
whom wealth is redistributed cannot readily emigrate to less redistributive
jurisdictions." This sentiment, for instance, may underlie much of the recent
school finance litigation that seeks state funding rather than local funding for
education. One may imagine an analogue in raising the costs to opting out
privately. If we believe that there is independent value in avoiding opting out,
then it may be possible to restructure the provision of services in a manner
that takes that value into account. Centralizing the provision of services, for
instance, could conceivably raise barriers to entry for privatized suppliers who
were unable to compete on a centralized scale, although they might easily
offer decentralized competition in smaller jurisdictions. Alternatively, central-
ized jurisdictions might regulate private entities or permit local jurisdictions to
do so in a manner that provided governmental monopolies free from antitrust
liability.56 The creation of such a monopoly would have the desired effect of
making it more difficult for dissatisfied constituents to select a provider who
offers a preferred level of service. Continuing the vocabulary from an earlier
part of this article, we can look at the increased exit costs as an effective
means of transforming the background service level from a default rule into an
immutable rule. But lest we conclude that immutable rules are an unequivocal
benefit, recall these same constraints will necessarily impose the costs of
noncompetitiveness and inability of some residents to attain their preferences.
Alternatively, we could lower the costs of remaining within the coalition
by offering informal "bribes" to those most likely to opt out. As a doctrinal
matter, the equal service provision doctrine makes explicit bribes difficult. But
implicit bribes may exist in the form of establishing priorities for serving
individuals who have substantial influence over governmentally provided
goods and services consistent with the interests of those who might otherwise
exit. This influence may exist either with respect to political officials or with
respect to like-minded residents who would not want to lose the support of
those who might otherwise opt out. In either case, those with the capacity to
opt out will be able to exercise disproportionate influence even though they
55. See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd & Fred C. Doolittle, Which Level of Government Should Assist
the Poor?, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 323 (1982).
56. On the scope of municipal antitrust immunity, see City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985);
Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 672-76 (1991); Glen
0. Robinson, The Sherman Act as a Home Rule Charter: Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 2 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 131 (1983).
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have little capacity to organize or to generate collective political action. 7 Of-
ficials have incentives to provide desired services to these individuals in order
to avoid their exit, a result that would reduce the tax base and require either
additional taxation or reduction of services, either of which would continue the
spiral of exit by shifting additional mobile residents to the margin between
living within that jurisdiction and their next preferred residence.58
Our reaction to opting out, therefore, may depend on whether we think
that public officials tend to be influenced more by the preferences of the elec-
toral majority or by those of a rent-paying minority. Perhaps perversely, the
more we think that public officials respond to the interests of their constitu-
ents, the more confident we should be in allowing those with other preferences
to opt for private provision. Where public officials are attentive to the interests
of their constituents, there is less need for retaining political coalitions that
might contest the status quo. Hence, in those situations, the costs of opting out
are less likely to outweigh the competitive benefits and the increased utility of
satisfying individual preferences. But the discussion to this point also suggests
that certain characteristics of the public provider may affect the propriety of
opting out. Political costs will tend to be less in small jurisdictions, if those
jurisdictions contain constituents with relatively homogeneous tastes for public
goods and services, that is, if the Tiebout assumptions work fairly well. In
such a case, the range of constituent preferences is likely to be smaller, as is
the possibility that the level of service provided deviates substantially from the
level widely preferred. If that is the case, then it is likely that those individuals
who do opt out have preferences that deviate only marginally from the back-
ground level, and the political costs related to opting out should therefore be
small. If, however, the small jurisdiction is not composed of residents with
homogeneous preferences, the inference from opting out is more complicated.
It may reveal the traditional Madisonian concern about factions dominating in
small areas. Alternatively, substantial opting out may reveal that residents are
in agreement that the government should provide a level of service that re-
flects the lowest common denominator preferred by all residents, while addi-
tional increments are purchased privately.
Homogeneity, moreover, does not unambiguously support liberal opting
out. Public goods that have significant distributional effects may require more
stringent measures to keep coalitions together, and allowing individuals to
satisfy more tailored and homogeneous preferences may interfere with the
ability to provide public goods to others. In these situations, the political costs
of allowing opting out may be significant, notwithstanding that constraints on
exit eliminate the benefits of competition. In the next Section, therefore, I
concentrate on the characteristics of specific goods and services to determine
the factors that favor and disfavor opting out of the background level of ser-
vice.
57. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 48, at 77.
58. See David F. Bradford & Harry H. Kelejian, An Econometric Model of the Flight to the
Suburbs, 81 J. POL. ECON. 566 (1973).
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III. OPTING OUT AND EXTERNAL EFFECTS
A. The Imposition of Substantive Costs
To this point, I have been alluding to the possibility that opting out could
impose costs on those who continue to accept the background level of a ser-
vice. I have suggested that these costs frequently take a political form in that
opting out alters the mix of opinions that are heard by political officials who
make decisions about the level of service to provide to constituents. In this
Section, I identify different types of costs and the conditions under which they
would arise. The result is to afford a more complex, but more thorough means
of determining whether allowing or discouraging opting out is a socially desir-
able strategy in a particular situation.
There are two senses in which the decision by some members of the com-
munity to opt out of the background level of service provision may adversely
affect others in the collective. First, the level of service selected by those who
opt out may impose explicit and direct costs on those who remain and whose
interests are not considered in the decision to opt out. Think, for instance, of a
university that uses its own disciplinary system for sanctioning students rather
than turning students who violate public laws over to local authorities for
prosecution.59 The punishment meted out by college officials in such circum-
stances is typically less than we would expect from public prosecution of the
same offense. Indeed, given that college officials will not have the power of
the state to deprive defendants of liberty or substantial property, it is axiomatic
that private punishment will result in less severe sanctions.' The reasons for
the decision to use in-house sanctions exclusively may be relatively benign.
College officials may believe that publicity of the punishment within the col-
lege community means that the official sanction will be augmented by com-
munal shaming that has a more serious effect on the malefactor than prosecu-
tion within the larger society.6 Or officials may be motivated by more
malign motives, such as the desire to avoid adverse publicity for the institution
(e.g., as a place where crimes occur or where there is rampant drug or alcohol
use) or to protect members of an athletic team.62 Regardless of motive, how-
ever, the private decision to prosecute within the small community threatens to
disserve the interests of the larger society. For instance, to the extent that the
violator engages in recidivism that would have been forestalled by public pros-
ecution and incarceration, and to the extent that recidivism takes place outside
the college community, the private system may punish insufficiently. These
effects are essentially the same as would occur in any system of private
59. See Nina Bernstein, With Colleges Holding Court, Discretion Vies with Fairness, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1996, at A].
60. Of course, the college could both impose internal sanctions and turn the offender over
for public prosecution. Public prosecution may be favored by alleged offenders insofar as it enti-
tles them to procedural protections that may be unavailable privately.
61. On the efficacy of shaming as a punitive measure, see Daniel Kahan, What Do Alterna-
tive Sanctions Mean?, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 563 (1996). It appears to be the case, however, that
frequently those who bring the offense to light are the ones who suffer communal shame. See
Bernstein, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Michael Farber, Coach and Jury, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 25, 1995, at 31.
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justice, since such systems leave punishment decisions in the hands of those
who typically have personal motivations that lead them to impose too little or
too much punishment compared to the social ideal.63 Similarly, a privatized
security force hired by a business improvement district may deter crime in that
district, but possibly only by shifting the location of misbehavior and thus in-
creasing crime elsewhere.
The second sense in which opting out may impose costs on others, the
imposition of political costs with which I am primarily concerned, is different
in nature from these more substantive externalities. The political costs affect
the procedures by which officials set the background level of a particular ser-
vice. Thus, the ultimate decision in these cases continues to be made by rep-
resentatives of constituents. The issue is whether opting out by some residents
alters the decision made by those representatives.
B. Opting Out of Political Participation
There are several ways in which those who opt out may change the roles
they play in public debate about the background level of service. I alluded
above to the possibility that those who serve as superior monitors of official
misbehavior might be less interested in fulfilling that function once they pri-
vately contract out of the background level of service. But the more serious
claim is that those who opt out will not simply be passive about the service
level for those who remain, but will react with animosity or selfishness to
restrict the background level of service. The suspicion is that if those who
seek a higher level of service must pay for it, they will fail to support the
background level of which they do not take advantage.
It is worthwhile to consider these claims separately, as they raise signifi-
cantly different issues. The first claim is addressed to the willingness of those
who opt out to exclude themselves from the affairs of the larger community.
The claim is reminiscent of deTocqueville's assertion that democracies foster
individualism, defined as "a calm and considered feeling which disposes each
citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the
circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he
gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself." Thus, detractors of
residential associations claim that individuals who live within private groups
are likely to suffer a diminished sense of civic responsibility.65 But the claim
63. This is not to say that social mechanisms of justice consistently impose punishments that
correspond to the social ideal. The incentives of litigants and their attorneys often cause what from
a social perspective appears to be underinvestment or overinvestment in litigation. But failure to
implement perfectly a system designed to reflect all social interests is different in kind from pri-
vate enforcement mechanisms that are not designed in the first instance to reflect the interests of
all those affected by criminal activity.
64. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 506 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
65. See, e.g., MCKENZIE, supra note 27, at 141; Kennedy, supra note 27, at 777. But see
ROBERT J. DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 134-35 (1992) (concluding that "the evidence concerning [residential
associations'] impact on political participation is mixed," and that in some cases membership in
such an association increases participation in local politics).
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is somewhat ambiguous in its reach, and it has very different merit depending
on how one interprets it.
The most general form of this claim implies that those who opt for privat-
ized versions of public functions will withdraw from the public sphere gener-
ally. This form of the claim is the most problematic. Individuals who opt out
of background levels of service of residential street paving or safety protection
remain members of the larger polity for multiple other functions, including
schools, foreign policy, and federal income tax levels. That those who live in
gated communities thereby are less affected by and become less interested in
crime rates in other parts of the locality (and if they work, shop, or socialize
in those areas, even that assumption may be unjustified) does not entail that
they ignore civic concerns over zoning, state and federal legislative elections,
or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Indeed, the fact that members of residential
associations share a community of interest suggests that they may become
more involved in civic affairs, because their common interests facilitate solu-
tions to collective action problems that would otherwise make efforts at civic
action improvident.
There are, however, narrower forms of the claim that may be more telling.
Detractors may be objecting that those who opt out are likely to form coali-
tions only to foster the narrow interests of the association's members rather
than for the common good. One would, in fact, be concerned that once mem-
bers of a privatized business improvement district had "taxed" themselves to
repair sidewalks and promote their stores (thus creating an advantage over
competitors) they would lobby against proposed tax expenditures by the locali-
ty to provide similar services to other commercial areas in the jurisdiction.
Similarly, those who send their children to private school may oppose addi-
tional public school funding. Any such objection is very different from the
claim that those who opt out will fail to exercise civic responsibility at all.
Opting out, however, does not necessarily generate conflict between those
who opt out and those who select the background level of service, nor does it
necessarily reflect conflict of an undesirable sort. Take first the latter point,
the possibility that any conflict may actually be desirable. Certainly, if the
choice of background rules is itself governed by dominant interests rather than
by majoritarian concerns, those who choose to opt out cannot readily be de-
scribed as excluding themselves from the community, since the background
level of services does not reflect the choice of the community in the first
place. Indeed, if we believe that public debate is already informed by en-
trenched interests, then the addition of another cohesive group may actually
generate more publicly interested decisionmaking. Assume, for instance, that
commercial developers are attempting to displace current zoning regulations to
permit more commercial development and face little opposition from residents
because of traditional obstacles to collective action. The increased capacity of
"privatized" residents to use their neighborhood association as a competing
interest group may actually increase the chances that anti-development voices
will be heard in the process. Thus, the political implications of opting out may
turn out to be political benefits rather than costs.
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Moreover, whether those who opt out will oppose public expenditures on
similar services depends on the relationship between the privately supplied
level of service and the publicly supplied background level. In some cases,
those who opt out of the background level of service purchase an additional
increment of service from a private provider; in other cases, opting out entails
complete displacement of the government provider. For instance, the members
of a business improvement district who contribute to a fund for private securi-
ty guards should still be willing to support a high level of police service, be-
cause they receive benefits from both public and private sources. Since these
merchants must pay all the direct costs of the incremental service, they would
presumably prefer that the basic service, supported by tax dollars, be optimal
in order to reduce their additional cost. (Although, a district comprising stores
that could afford private protection more readily than their competitors might
oppose public financing in order to give themselves a competitive advantage
by offering a safe shopping area.) I may believe that police services are ade-
quate to provide my business with sufficient protection during daytime hours,
so that I only have to hire private guards during evening hours; but I might
object to reduction in police budgets because that would cause me to hire
private guards during daytime hours as well. Similarly, those who send their
children to public schools but who hire tutors to augment their children's edu-
cation might become more concerned about the level of public education,
since they would prefer to save the tutoring costs and not want to incur the
still higher costs of private school. The fact that individuals seek higher levels
of service in these cases, therefore, does not suggest that they will attempt to
undermine or abandon political coalitions that seek to deliver socially optimal
levels of the desired service.
In other situations, however, the higher level of service cannot be pur-
chased in increments above the basic level. Opting out in these cases sub-
sumes provision of the background level as well as the desired increment.
Those who send their children to private schools in search of a more religious
education than the locality provides, for instance, may be less willing to sup-
port public schools because their children receive all their formal education,
not just a marginal amount, from private schools. In this situation those who
opt out may not simply fail to support the level of the background service that
is preferred by those who do not opt out, but may actively encourage govern-
ments to underinvest in impure public goods for which there are reasonable
club or private substitutes. This is the situation represented by the merchants
who opt out by repairing their own sidewalks and then lobby to reduce their
tax outlay for the background level of service that they do not utilize, and that
may actually compete with their privatized benefits.
Indeed, legal doctrine may exacerbate the problem by giving those with
the capacity to opt for higher levels of service incentives to constrain
governmentally provided services at artificially low levels. Given obligations
of equal service provision, providing amenities to the wealthy requires officials
to provide those same amenities to all within the jurisdiction. It is unlikely that
increased police protection, parks, or school budgets could be offered only to
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those willing and able to pay for them.' Once offered throughout the juris-
diction, however, these same amenities are likely to attract more poor house-
holds.67 Any such shift in population will, in turn, increase the costs of sup-
plying both the new services and other welfare services that require
redistributive taxation from the relatively wealthy, again triggering the spiral
of exit by the relatively wealthy, who are most capable of exercising that op-
tion. Those who are capable of contracting for club goods may attempt to
avoid this spiral, without formal violation of the equal service doctrine, by
lobbying for relatively low levels of public service, augmented by privately
provided services for those who can contract for them.
Even in these cases, however, there exist countervailing incentives that
might deter both officials and those who could opt out from artificially limit-
ing the scope of public services. From the perspective of officials, reducing
local expenditures is inconsistent with explanations of bureaucratic behavior
that contend budget-maximizing bureaucrats spend larger sums of money than
an informed majority would prefer;' publicly interested officials might want
to avoid disparities in the provision of services; officials may have particular
programmatic concerns that require service delivery that is inconsistent with
the preferences of those who opt out (e.g., officials who want to support work-
ing mothers may sponsor municipal day-care centers notwithstanding that
constituents capable of opting for private services are unlikely to use them);
officials concerned about personal advancement may be attentive to accusa-
tions that they provided low levels of service in their current office; and offi-
cials faced with the possibility of competition from private providers might
prefer to raise the level of service to all in order to disguise inefficiencies that
would be apparent in a competitive environment.
Similarly, residents who are able to opt out might prefer to pay for bene-
fits that they do not enjoy, either out of altruism or to avoid reductions in
property values, which are likely to reflect the quality of services. This latter
phenomenon is plausible where even the wealthy have limited mobility, such
as where the relevant jurisdiction is large or where wealth is tied to the partic-
ular jurisdiction (through jobs or proximity to kinship groups). In this situa-
tion, even if conditions otherwise favor imposing political costs, e.g., even
where the higher level of service subsumes the background level, those who
opt out have incentives to be concerned with the service available to others.
Those who send their children to private schools (or who do not have
66. With respect to some services, however, it appears that localities may offer differential
services, depending on residents' willingness to pay, even if that willingness reflects ability to pay
or creates other divisions, such as racial ones. For instance, in Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F.
Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), a locality was deemed not to have violated any constitutional equal
protection obligation when it failed to pave streets unless abutters agreed to pay for the im-
provement through special assessments. The result of the local policy was that 3% percent of the
city's white residents lived along unpaved streets, compared to approximately 35% of the black
residents.
67. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity,
92 HARV. L. REv. 1662, 1723 (1979).
68. See WILLIAM A. NisKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIvE GOVERNMENT
(1971).
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children), for instance, may support public schools because the value of the
public education system is capitalized into the value of their homes.69 These
homeowners cannot be certain that their purchasers will share their preferenc-
es; hence, if they believe that educational quality is an important factor in
housing prices, they have reason to support educational expenditures of which
they do not take direct advantage.
Political costs may be exacerbated where opting out adversely affects the
feasibility of providing the background level preferred by those who remain.
Under these circumstances, those who opt out are not merely exercising dis-
proportionate political influence in opposing public provision of public goods.
Instead, the very act of opting out may render public provision of the good in-
feasible, because opting out eliminates certain economies that make collective
provision attractive. Municipal facilities frequently have elements of
"publicness" because they require substantial capital outlays. But these same
characteristics frequently mean that the goods are in the nature of step goods
that cannot be provided in small increments but only in large, expensive doses
(half a bridge is as useless as no bridge). Opting out may create a situation
where public provision is abandoned because there remain an insufficient
number of people to make investment in the next step worthwhile, notwith-
standing that provision would have been appropriate if all residents participat-
ed. For instance, charges for the service may be based on costs to those who
actually use it, and if departure by some residents does not reduce the fixed
costs made by the jurisdiction (e.g., one garbage truck must be purchased for a
city of 1000 households whether all residents have governmental garbage
collection or only one does), then those who opt out may increase per capita
costs to those who accept the background level.
It is equally plausible, however, that opting out could reduce costs for
those who remain. This result would occur when the publicly provided good is
subject to congestion, but congestion (which would require provision of addi-
tional increments of the good) is avoided because some residents select private
providers of substitute goods. Assume, for instance, that no families within a
locality sent their children to private schools. It might be necessary to con-
struct and staff additional public schools in order to avoid overcrowding. If the
capital expense incurred to meet congestion increases the pro rata cost to each
resident, then the fact that opting out eliminates the need for the new facility
can return a benefit to those who use public facilities.
The indefinite consequences of opting out on the costs for those who
remain can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that a municipal
swimming pool can comfortably accommodate 100 persons, that the swimming
pool costs $1000 to construct and operate, and that it makes no sense to con-
struct a second smaller swimming pool if there are fewer than 100 potential
users per pool, perhaps because future population growth is expected to mate-
rialize within the useful life of the pool. If there are 150 swimmers in the
community, two swimming pools will be necessary, with the cost to be shared
69. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on
Property Values: A Reply and Yet Further Results, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1004 (1973).
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by 150 swimmers. Thus, each swimmer will have to pay $2000/150, or $13.33
towards the pools. Now, assume that we again have 150 swimmers within the
jurisdiction, but 50 swimmers join a private pool club (they may, for instance,
be willing to pay for less crowding, longer hours of operation, status, etc.).
There is now no current need for the second pool, so that each of the remain-
ing "municipal" swimmers needs only pay only $1000/100, or $10 toward the
pool.
Unfortunately, this argument may also work in the opposite direction.
Assume that the residents value the pool at $15 as long as no more than 100
people use it, but at no more than $9 if between 100 and 150 use it. Now
assume that if all 150 swimmers use the municipal pool, the municipality will
construct a second pool, so that each swimmer pays $13.33. If only 110 swim-
mers use the pool, the municipality may find it more appropriate to tolerate
congestion than to construct a new pool. (Under these conditions, the 110
swimmers would have to pay $18.18 for two pools, in excess of what they
would be willing to pay.) If 40 swimmers opt for the private pool, the 110
remaining swimmers would have to pay $9.09, an amount in excess of what
they would be willing to pay for the congested pool. Hence, some swimmers
will be unable to use the pool at a price they are willing to pay, even though
they would have been willing to pay for a less congested pool.7"
Ex ante, there is no reason to believe that opting out is more likely to
reduce the capital expenditure to a manageable amount (the first case) than it
is to frustrate the ability to make the service available at a price that would be
affordable if all participated (the second case). None of this is to say that re-
strictions on mandatory participation would not reduce the utility to those who
would like to opt out but could not. It is only to say that the marginal effect of
opting out is difficult to calculate ex ante.
But let us take as given that those who opt out and thereby do not take
advantage of the background level of service subsequently fail to support that
level. Does it follow either that the background level will be inefficient (in
that those who would have been subsidized by the payments made by those
who opt out gain more than the defectors lose) or that any inefficiency favors
redistributional goals? One can tell a more complicated story about the cross
subsidies inherent in the decision to opt out without any offset for the pay-
ments made in respect of the foregone service." If the background level of
service is financed through compulsory taxation that those who opt out cannot
escape (such as residents who pay taxes to support public schools even while
sending their children to private schools), then wealth is being redistributed.
70. For another example, assume that there are three members of a society, all of whom
desire garbage to be collected. Two of the members would value weekly garbage collection if they
did not have to pay more than $4 per week for it. The third member would be willing to spend at
least $4 for weekly garbage collection, but also values twice-a-week garbage collection and is
willing to pay $12 per week for it. Weekly garbage collection costs $9, and twice-a-week garbage
collection costs $12. If permitted, the third member will contract for twice-a-week garbage collec-
tion. The result is that the first two members will not get weekly garbage collection at all, since
they will be unable to obtain it at a cost that they are willing to spend on it.
71. See Gillette, supra note 20, at 1393.
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Assume, for instance, that property tax payments are used to pay for snow
plowing of all city streets. Individuals may live on private streets in part be-
cause they can contract with private snow plowers for speedier service than
the locality is able to provide to residential neighborhoods. Taxes paid by
those individuals, however, are used to plow public streets. Once the owners
of the privatized streets emerge from their enclave and drive on the plowed
public streets, they are obtaining the benefit of their tax payments. Neverthe-
less, the locality would have had to plow their residential streets out of tax
payments had the residents of the privatized area not done so themselves.
Hence, the fact that the locality did not have to plow those streets means that
(1) the total local outlay for snow plowing was less than it otherwise would
have been, a cost-reduction from which all local residents (not just the abutters
of the private streets) benefit; and (2) the residents of private streets are pay-
ing a greater share of the snow plowing budget than similarly situated resi-
dents of public streets. 72 This redistribution, however, does not necessarily
transfer wealth from wealthy to poor or from those who receive less utility
from a service to those who receive more. Again, local homogeneity suggests
that redistribution within the locality occurs within relatively narrow parame-
ters of wealth.
It is, of course, possible to avoid "double payments," either by rebating
tax payments to those who opt out," or by allowing opting out with respect
to services subsidized only by user fees (which those who opt out would not
pay, since they would not be using the public facility). But in the absence of
such adjustments, double payments complicate the issue of whether opting out
redistributes wealth regressively.
C. Opting Out and Community
Although I have been attempting to distinguish between substantive
externalities and the procedural political costs generated by opting out, there is
one series of effects of the former that is worth additional attention. These
effects are perhaps best captured by the term "community" which some have
suggested is undermined by allowing individuals to opt out. Presumably the
concern is that individuals within a constituency obtain additional value out of
sharing the same public goods, and that value is diluted by allowing some
members of the community to reject or supplement communally provided
goods. For example, some of the literature on educational quality suggests that
the best predictor of educational quality is not financial inputs or class size,
but other variables, such as the quality of one's peers.74 If we believe that
those who are most likely to leave low-quality public schools for higher
72. See, e.g., DILGER, supra note 65, at 102.
73. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2 to -23.8 (West 1992).
74. The early entry into this debate was the Coleman Report in 1966. See JAMES S.
COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966). The debate about the rela-
tionship between financial inputs and educational outputs has raged since. For a collection of the
sources and their conclusions, see Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational
Finance, and Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1747-49 (1995).
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quality private ones are individuals who would have been "better" peers of
those who remain, then opting out imposes real, but less measurable, costs.
Since, however, we do not expect all those who might contribute to educa-
tional equality to do so, i.e., we do not expect individuals to migrate to areas
where they might provide the greatest advantage to other students, there ap-
pears to be some special claim about the obligation of those who live within a
community to other residents of the same jurisdiction. Thus, many of the
concerns about opting out ultimately depend on the independent value of
maintaining equality within a defined community.
The value of community is rooted in a belief that differential service
breeds dissent and inequality, each of which may tear at the soul of the com-
munity that service provision fosters. The problem is exacerbated to the extent
that one obtains a differential level of service through arrangements with pri-
vate providers. Circumventing public provision arguably violates what it
means to be a member of the community, since the community is defined by
the services it provides to all. If we return to the rough categorization of
sources of provision with which I began, those who appeal to community seek
to identify the community more closely with kinship groups and to distance
the community from market and governmental transactions.
To the extent that one embraces the value of community, the delicate
balance of political costs and competitive benefits, or appeals to individual
preferences, are essentially irrelevant. The political costs inherent in opting out
are necessarily so great (political cohesion being the basis of the community)
that marginal gains in efficiency from competition are inevitably trumped. In
addition, satisfaction of individual preferences is presumably of less concern,
since the maintenance of community necessarily requires compromise of indi-
vidual desires. I cannot claim that this value is (or should be) unknown in
local government law. To the contrary, the desire to maintain a strong sense of
community can be used to explain a significant amount of local government
law." One may, for instance, think of this concern as underlying the doctrine
of equal service provision. 6
Nevertheless, the equal-service doctrine, and preferences for community
as embodied in current law generally, provide only limited support for the
proposition that intrajurisdictional variations in service cannot be tolerated.
With respect to many public goods, the mandate that service be provided
"equally" does not translate into equality of result, but only to formal equality
of opportunity. For instance, the doctrine applies to services that are financed
through user fees, but in that context the doctrine only requires that individuals
have an equal right to obtain the service on payment of the required fee. Since
some individuals will have a preference for more of the fee-based service than
others (those with gardens and swimming pools will use more publicly
75. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (reasoning that desire to maintain stable
population and hence advance concept of community justifies property tax based on value of
home at time of acquisition rather than current market value).
76. See ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY 43-45 (1977); see also supra
text accompanying notes 42-43.
1214 [Vol. 73:4
OPTING OUT OF PUBLIC PROVISION
supplied water than those without), the result will be different per capita usag-
es of the same service, albeit the payments made by each individual will re-
flect the amount of use. As long as opting out entails making payments for the
additional levels of service, and as long as all share the opportunity to opt out,
exercise of that option does not violate the equal service requirement even as
understood in communitarian accounts of local government. Hence, no greater
concern arises when inequality stems from privately provided services. Never-
theless, one might claim that governments, by selecting when to utilize user
fees, thereby choose appropriate levels of intrajurisdictional inequality. Private
decisions to opt out may transcend acceptable boundaries of inequality.
Constraints on opting out to foster community, however, are subject to a
broader attack. First, for those who advocate development of community, the
fact that club goods require the creation of voluntary associations could be
cause for support. That individuals share preferences for particular goods or
services does not require homogeneity in other aspects of their lives. Individu-
als who desire more religion in their lives and who thus opt out of public
schools for parochial education may find themselves in a subcommunity with
whom, but for this preference, they would share little social or political inter-
action. If I live in a neighborhood that is socially and economically homoge-
neous, but send my children to a church school that attracts children from
other neighborhoods, I may create a more complex series of relationships
(some in my geographic neighborhood and some in my religious community)
than would be the case if I sent my children to the public neighborhood
school. Clubs, therefore, may engender a level of interaction among communi-
ties not otherwise readily available.
Even without the formation of stronger intrajurisdictional bonds, however,
the appeal to community is not necessarily undermined by opting out, espe-
cially when the alternatives are considered. Opting out of the background level
of service offers a private contractual analogue to a more traditional
Tieboutian acquisition of the desired level of service through physical exit.
Thus, one who is generally satisfied with the package of services in the com-
munity, but dissatisfied with the level of a particular service, may pursue any
one of three strategies. She may remain in the community and accept a sub-
optimal level of service, or she may opt out with respect to the unsatisfactory
service, or she may exit the jurisdiction. Which option the individual chooses
depends on the private costs of each option. Physical exit may be relatively
costly, so that it is selected only when the service at issue is of substantial
importance. But if the individual is an outlier with respect to that service, then
both she and the community (of which she would thereby remain a part) might
be better off if she can opt out of that service alone. Assume, for instance, that
an individual shares the communal interest in most services, but has an idio-
syncratic preference for education. If the individual's concern about education
is sufficiently great that exit would be worthwhile, it is unclear that anyone is
better off when she exits the jurisdiction rather than contracts privately for
better education.
Perhaps out of awareness of the greater costs of physical exit, the legal
regime does not identify community with conformity, even where it encourag-
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es the former. Recall the situations that I noted above in which mandatory
participation is required, such as in areas of Social Security or automobile
insurance. It is plausible to think of these situations not simply as solutions to
common pool problems, but also as efforts to foster a sense of community by
requiring subsidies and avoiding catastrophic losses to any resident of the
jurisdiction. In all these cases, prohibitions on augmenting the basic require-
ment are possible. The consequence in each case, however, would be addition-
al dissatisfaction among those forced to participate at a personally undesirable
level. What we might infer from the combination of obligatory participation
with the possibility of opting for additional service, therefore, is that the
communitarian sentiment seeks to ensure a basic level for all constituents, but
does not, at least within a wide range, support a prohibition on opting out.
IV. CAN YOU OPT FOR LEss?
To this point, the examples I have used assumed that those who opt out
prefer a higher level of service than government otherwise provides. Presum-
ably, one would opt for less of a governmentally provided service only if
doing so generated some alternative good or service that was more valuable to
the individual than what had been surrendered. The fact that one is attaining a
net gain means that the definitional issue of what constitutes less, rather than
more, services is difficult to resolve. In addition, the concept of "service" is
sufficiently malleable to render the inquiry into "less" more sophistic than
sophisticated. When a residential subdivision prohibits leafletting, is it provid-
ing more services, in the form of regimentation and conformity not available
outside the gated walls, or less services, insofar as residents are denied restric-
tions on regulatory interference that would apply where governments are the
relevant actors? The definitional conundrum is not what interests me here;
rather I want, under the (perhaps unfortunate) rubric of "opting for less" than
a background level of service, to inquire into the propriety of private regula-
tions that cannot easily be administered by governmental bodies and that are
imposed with respect to services typically associated with government.
With respect to some services, opting for less simply means that persons
entitled to take advantage of services fail to do so, e.g., a failure to call the
police when a crime has been committed or to use as much electricity as the
municipal utility will provide. These forms of opting for less are trivial and
are not my concern here. But there is another sense in which opting for less
has significant import. One type of good or service the government provides is
a series of protections against the government itself, that is, an embodiment of
negative freedom. These protections typically take the form of rights that indi-
viduals have against governmental interference. But there may be occasions in
which individuals would like to make pre-commitments enforceable by gov-
ernment, or in which individuals prefer to have government act
paternalistically. Assume, for instance, that relatively poor individuals have
limited options about where to reside. They value the safety of wealthy sub-
urbs, but (private markets for housing being what they are) cannot afford
them. They may attempt to "privatize" security by purchasing strong locks,
carrying weapons in self-defense, or joining in collective security arrangements
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that range from watching each other's homes to private policing (e.g., the
"Guardian Angels"). But another alternative is to join an association of (con-
tract with) like-minded individuals to agree to a regimentation that is inconsis-
tent with our traditional concerns about protections from government. For
instance, residents within an apartment complex may be willing to require
identification cards for entrance or to abandon their rights to be free of search-
es and authorize random searches of the apartment for guns and drugs.
7
Would we think that this kind of "opting out" is appropriate?
Alternatively, think of Professor Katherine Van Wezel Stone's concerns
about private procedures that displace judicial adjudication with arbitration that
allegedly reduces workers' rights."8 The move to private arbitration of labor
disputes or disputes in other contexts typically entails fewer procedural safe-
guards than in full-fledged judicial proceedings. Presumably, those who agree
to arbitrate believe that what they gain in speed of dispute resolution, cost
savings, and avoidance of abusive discovery procedures outweighs what they
surrender in terms of traditional safeguards in governmentally administered
proceedings. Thus, opting out of background rights by selecting private dispute
resolution allows parties to attain their preferences.
The possibility of opting out of substantive or procedural "rights,"
however, may cause the same concerns as opting out for more services than
the background level provided by government. At least in some cases, we
create rights not out of paternalism or to codify a bargain that we think most
parties would prefer if left to their own devices. Instead, a right may be recog-
nized to reduce the costs that serve as obstacles to the creation of public
goods. Free speech, for instance, may be defended less as a benefit for the
speaker than as an inducement to generate the public good of information for
listeners. Where rights are rooted in public goods, failure to exercise a right
generates costs for others. An individual who agrees to waive the right to
speak freely may be acting autonomously, and thus in service of some objec-
tives of the First Amendment. But that same individual thereby deprives others
of information in abrogation of alternative objectives of that same concept.
Indeed, the desire to avoid disincentives against providing the public good of
information appears to lie behind doctrines such as "chilling effects" and toler-
ance for untruths that cannot easily withstand scrutiny on alternative justifica-
tions for free speech.
Perhaps this objection provides better support for Professor Stone's con-
cerns. One may be relatively untroubled by the reduction of workers' statutory
77. Cf Amitai Etzioni, Balancing Act; Don't Sacrifice the Common Good to Personal
"'Rights", Cin. TRIB., May 16, 1994, at 11. For a determination that warrantless searches for
weapons in an apartment complex operated by a public housing authority is presumptively uncon-
stitutional, see Pratt v. Chicago Housing Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 795-96 (N.D. Ill. 1994). More
than 5,000 residents of projects operated by the authority signed a petition in favor of warrantless
searches. See Pratt v. Chicago Housing Auth., 155 F.R.D. 177, 178 (N.D. Il1. 1994). For an argu-
ment that even governmental action is not unconstitutional in this context, see Steven Yarosh,
Comment, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago Housing Authority "Sweeping" Away the
Fourth Amendment?, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
78. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
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rights either if one believed that they resulted from competition in a working
political market between labor and management or that the ostensibly "defeat-
ed" had accepted arbitration as a trade-off for avoiding the costs inherent in
adjudication. But reduction of those rights is less acceptable if the failure to
exercise those rights deprives others, not parties to the bargain, of the benefits
that those rights were created to generate. Arbitration, for instance, eliminates
the public goods that adjudication confers on non-parties in the form of prece-
dents that provide notice of acceptable conduct and that ensure the similar
treatment of similar cases.79
Other instances of opting for less similarly threaten external benefits.
Think, for instance, of failures to assert rightful claims against sellers of defec-
tive products who are supposed to invest optimally in safety as a result of the
incentives of a negligence system, but who go underdeterred where potential
cases are unlitigated. The point here is not that these cases systematically
cause benefits to be forgone. There are, after all, offsetting correctives, such as
high jury awards in cases that are litigated and that thus help compensate for
the unlitigated cases. And in some cases, rights are intended to create highly
privatized benefits that may generate public goods when surrendered; for in-
stance, shopping mall owners may have the right to exclude solicitors and
leafletters, but may increase the availability of information when they choose
not to exercise that right."0 My point instead is that the category of cases in
which individuals opt for less is both far-ranging and susceptible to the same
analysis as more traditional cases of opting out insofar as each one ultimately
depends on the consequences of the act for those who could not participate in
the bargain.
Nevertheless, the balance of political costs and competitive benefits may
be more readily resolvable in cases of opting for less. It is unlikely that a
critical mass of those protected by a right will abandon it, so that the public
goods generated by rights are less likely to be foregone. Exercising fewer
rights than one possesses, therefore, poses less of a risk of a downward spiral
leading to a deterioration of the right itself. Thus, the signaling function of
exit might work here with less threat that the political advantages of collective
provision will be reduced.
V. CONCLUSION
Reactions to opting out tend to be somewhat visceral and to be derivative
of other values. Whether one believes that such mundane, but visible acts such
as living in a residential association, sending one's children to private school,
or forming a business improvement district are elitist or part of democratic
choice, frequently appears to reflect one's views of redistribution, community,
and the acceptable level of externalities imposed by individual conduct. I have
tried to show that there is more that we can say about this issue, and that the
79. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1978); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2622-23 (1995).
80. See WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, CITY LiFE 209 (1995).
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complexities allow us to think in more precise terms about the propriety of
opting out of public provision in any particular context. Opting out always
signals some level of dissatisfaction with the status quo and may signal the
presence of a competitive alternative that may correct faulty political deci-
sions. Whether we should invite such signals depends on whether the process
of amplification improves on more opaque alternatives or generates intolerable
costs to political life. But even focusing on these factors fails to reveal the full
complexity of opting out. Our willingness to risk efficient provision, efficient
politics, or community, varies from service to service. Thus, some multi-
dimensional matrix would be necessary to weigh properly all the variables that
inform the propriety of opting out in a given context. My objective at the
moment is simply to overcome the view that our reactions are readily reduc-
ible to a single-minded embrace of the public or the private.

